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ESSAYS
AMERICAN CITIES AS FIRMS IN THE 2 1ST CENTURY-
OR, SHOULD PHILADELPHIA MOVE TO
NEW JERSEY?
RICHARDSON DILWORTH*
New Jersey has for a long time not known what to do with Cam-
den. From 1950 to 2000, the city's population declined from 124,555 to.
79,904.1 In 1999, the median household income of $23,421 was 57%
less than the state median of $55,146; slightly more than 35% of the
population lived below the federal poverty line (compared to 8.5% of the
state population); and the median value of owner-occupied housing units
in 2000 was $40,700, approximately 76% less than the state median of
$170,800.2 Camden has been the site for "all manner of unwanted incur-
sions, from a sewage plant and garbage incinerator to a prison on its
waterfront and an interstate highway cutting through the city's fabric.
The city gradually [has come] to symbolize the physical blight and public
neglect that have challenged urban centers across the nation.
In addition to the city's miniscule residential tax base, many of the
major institutions in the city-Rutgers-Camden, the Adventure Aqua-
rium, and Cooper University Hospital, to name a few-are tax-exempt,
at least at the city level, and the payments in lieu of taxes that they pro-
vide are only a fraction of what their actual taxes would be.4 In 1981, the
* Richardson Dilworth is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of
the Center for Public Policy at Drexel University.
1. Campbell Gibson, Population of the 100 Largest Cities and Other Urban Places in
the United States tbl. 18 (U.S. Bureau of the Census Population Div. Working Paper No.
27, 1998), available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps
0027/rwps0027.html; U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATE & COUNTY QUICKFAcTS,
CAMDEN (CITY), NEW JERSEY, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/34/3410000.html
(last visited Apr. 31, 2010) [hereinafter CAMDEN QUICKFAcTS].
2. CAMDEN QuIcKFAcTS, supra note 1.
3. CAROLYN ADAMS, DAVID BARTELT, DAVID ELESH & IRA GOLDSTEIN,
RESTRUCTURING THE PHILADELPHIA REGION: METROPOLITAN DIVISIONS AND INE-
QUALITY 20 (2008) (citing HOWARD GILLETTE, JR., CAMDEN AFTER THE FALL:
DECLINE AND RENEWAL IN A POST-INDUSTRIAL CITY (2005)).
4. Matt Katz, Camden 's Waterfront-and Its Woes, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Nov.
9, 2009, at A9.
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city was put into partial receivership by the state to protect it from bank-
ruptcy,5 and it has since at least that time depended on state subsidies to
meet its operating budget.6
In 2002, the state legislature approved, and Governor Jim
McGreevey signed, the Municipal Rehabilitation and Economic Recov-
ery Act (MRERA), which provided for $175 million in loans and grants
for capital projects in Camden, and which effectively also put the city in
receivership by placing it under the control of a Chief Operating Officer
appointed by the governor. 7 Camden historian Howard Gillette has
noted that the MRERA, "although it addressed the effects of concen-
trated poverty, was crafted primarily to reduce the city's deficit."8 In fact,
it did neither. As one analyst testified in state legislative hearings in 2007,
"[s]ince FY 2003, the amount of special state aid required to close the
City's budget gap has increased from $9 million annually to over $47
million annually. Unless dramatic changes occur, this gap can be
expected to increase by at least $4-6 million annually for the next 3-5
years."9 After an extensive investigation, the Philadelphia Inquirer
reported in late 2009 that:
[M]easured by the standards of the recovery law itself ... politi-
cians and officials still failed to meet their goals. . . .Camden
residents are just as poor today and just as likely to be murdered.
They are just as unemployed and lacking in the skills to succeed at
work. Their children's reading and math skills are just as abysmal.
And the city is twice as reliant on state taxpayers as before.'
Yet Camden residents did receive some major improvements to the
state aquarium (the recipient of the largest amount of recovery funds),
such as the introduction of hippos.11
In his popular book Cities Without Suburbs, former Albuquerque
mayor and committed regionalist David Rusk identified Camden as an
American city past the "point of no return," meaning that "city-suburb
economic disparities [had] become so severe that, in a broad sense, the
5. Dwight Cunningham, Now State Takes Charge in Camden Budget Muddle, PHIL-
ADELPHIA INQUIRER, Apr. 2, 1981, at B3.
6. For discussion of Camden's historic budget deficit see GILLETTE, supra note
3, at 90-93, 102-103, 194, 197.
7. Municipal Rehabilitation and Economic Recovery Act, N.J. STAT. ANN.
§52:27BBB-2.1 (West 2010).
8. GILLET-rE, supra note 3, at 192 (2005).
9. Testimony, Public Comments, and Discussion About the Report Issued Pursuant to
the Municipal Rehabilitation and Economic Recovery Act: J Public Hearing Before the S.
Community and Urban Affairs Comm., and Assem. Housing and Local Government Comm.
54x (N.J. 2007) (testimony of Derek Ziegler, Researcher, CAMConnect), available at
http://www.camconnect.org/datalogue/camconnect-testimony1-30.pdf.
10. Matt Katz, Camden Rebirth: A Pledge Unmet, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Nov.
8, 2009, at A20.
11. Katz, supra note 4.
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city is no longer a place in which to invest or to create jobs (with the
exception of fortress-like downtown business districts)." 12 Such cities
"cannot escape the grip of ghetto poverty solely by their own efforts." 13
Rather than investing in downtown aquariums, Rusk's major suggestion
for cities in general was that they had to be able to expand geographi-
cally. Indeed, he has more recently argued that "[a] city's ability to annex
land from its surrounding county is a primary determinant of its fiscal
health."' 4 It is thus notable that Camden is a miniscule eight square
miles in size and is surrounded by more affluent and commercially
vibrant suburban municipalities that support the impoverished residents
of their neighboring city only insofar as their state and county tax dollars
come back to Camden to meet the city's annual budget deficit.
Like almost every rust belt city, Camden stopped expanding geo-
graphically almost a century ago. The city, first incorporated in 1850,
annexed part of Newton Township in 1871, the entire town of Stockton
in 1899, part of Haddon Township in 1918, and it has remained the
same size ever since.' 5 By contrast, cities in the Sunbelt have expanded
their jurisdictions tremendously since World War II, as reflected in the
fact that, in the 1980 federal census, when five of the ten most populous
cities in the United States were in the rust belt (New York, Chicago,
Philadelphia, Detroit, and Baltimore) and five were in the Sunbelt (Los
Angeles, Houston, Dallas, San Diego, and Phoenix), the average geo-
graphic size of the rust belt cities was 176.3 square miles, while the aver-
age of the Sunbelt cities was 399.62 square miles. 1 6 And the Sunbelt
cities have continued expanding and increasingly moving past the rust
belt cities in population size.
The significance of city size to the welfare of a city is evident by
comparing Houston and Newark, another New Jersey city; the compari-
son also illustrates the unattained aspirations of rust belt cities. In 1908,
the board of trade in Newark announced a bold plan for its city to annex
the majorities of Hudson and Essex counties, as well as parts of Bergen
and Union counties, to create what would have been the fourth-largest
city in the country. The results were less than impressive. Newark made
only one significant land annexation, absorbing the sparsely populated
and largely undeveloped Ivy Hill area in 1927, bringing the city up to its
12. DAVID RUSK, CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS 74 (2d ed. 1995) [hereinafter RUSK,
CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS].
13. Id. at 75.
14. DAVID RUSK, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, ANNEXATION AND THE FiscAL FATE
OF CITIES 1 (2006), available at http://www.brookings.edu/metro/pubs/20060810_fateof
cities.pdf [hereinafter RUSK, ANNEXATION].
15. JOHN P. SNYDER, THE STORY OF NEW JERSEY'S CIVIL BOUNDARIES:
1606-1968, at 104 (1969).
16. Gibson, supra note 1, at rbl.21; see generally KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRAB-
GRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES 138-56 (1985).
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current size of 23.6 square miles.17 By contrast, Houston was in 1908
even smaller than Newark (approximately 15 square miles), yet by 1948
the Texas city had expanded to 216 square miles. By 2000, it encom-
passed 580 square miles, with a population that made Houston, not
Newark, the fourth-largest city in the country.18
The divergent growth trajectories of the two cities have had signifi-
cant policy consequences. In 1999, median household income in Hous-
ton was $36,616, which was $3,311 less than the Texas state average,
while median household income in Newark was $26,913, which was less
than half the overall New Jersey average. In 2000, the home ownership
rate was 45.8% in Houston and 23.8% in Newark.1 9 The Texas Munici-
pal League uses Newark as an example of what Texas cities would have
become were they not able to expand their borders: "If San Antonio, for
example, had the same boundaries it had in 1945, it would contain more
poverty and unemployment tha[n] Newark, New Jersey."" °
Yet, even Texas cities may find themselves in the same position as
Newark in the future, and Houston is a case in point. While Houston
has been able to expand dramatically over the last half century, it has, as a
result, faced increasing resistance. Under the authority of a 1912 state
constitutional amendment that provided home rule cities broad authority
to unilaterally annex land, Houston engaged in an aggressive expansionist
strategy that ultimately prompted a reaction on the part of suburban
communities. These communities lobbied the legislature to pass the
1963 Municipal Annexation Act, which provided new procedural con-
straints on annexation.2" As the Texas Municipal League has noted,
17. RICHARDSON DILWORTH, THE URBAN ORIGINS OF SUBURBAN AUTONOMY
179-81, 190-91 (2005).
18. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CITY & COUNT QUIcKFACTS, HOUSTON
(cIry), TEXAS, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/48/4835000.htm (last visited June
18, 2010) [hereinafter HOUSTON QUIcKFAcTS]. For more information on Houston, see
Gibson, supra note 1. I am grateful to David Rusk for initially making this comparison
between Newark and Houston. See David Rusk, Book Review: Urban Origins of Suburban
Autonomy, by Richardson Dilworth, 25 J. PLAN., EDUC. & RES. 222, 223 (2005) [herein-
after Rusk, Book Review].
19. HOUSTON QUIcKFACTS, supra note 18; U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CITY
& COUNT QUICKFACTS, NEWARK (cITY), NEW JERSEY, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/
states/34/3451000.html (last visited June 22, 2010).
20. ScoTr HOUSTON, TEXAS MUNIcIPAL LEAGUE, MUNIcIPAL ANNEXATION IN
TEXAS: IS IT REALLY THAT COMPLICATED? 9 (2008) (citing TERRELL BLODGETT, TEXAS
MUNIcIPAL LEAGUE, TEXAS HOME RULE CHARTERS (1994)), available at http://www.
tml.org/legal-pdf/ANNEXATION0 12808.pdf.
21. See id. at 6 (discussing the home rule amendment and annexation); see also
Arnold Fleischmann, The Politics of Annexation: A Preliminary Assessment of Competing
Paradigms, 67 Soc. Sci. Q. 128, 135 (1986) (explaining similar instances in San Antonio
and Milwaukee, which "both resorted to defensive tactics such as litigation and lobby-
ing"); Robert P. Thomas, Metropolitan Structural Development: The Territorial Imperative,
14 PUBLius 83, 97-98 (1984).
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"[r]ural landowners and others have regularly turned to their legislators
for relief from city expansions, with the result that bills to curb unilateral
annexations have surfaced in every session for the past fifty years." z2 2 And
the Texas Senate Interim Committee on Annexation noted in its final
1998 report that "[a]nnexation has become an increasing source of con-
tention between residents of extraterritorial areas and cities, particularly
large cities." 23 Indeed, while Houston expanded by 132 square miles per
decade between 1950 and 1980, it actually lost territory in the 1980s,
and it gained a little less than 40 square miles in the 1990s.2 4 Since at
least the beginning of the twenty-first century, the population in the
outer counties in the Houston-Sugar Land-Bayton Metropolitan Area has
been growing significantly faster than the population in the inner coun-
ties. 25 This offers evidence of the sobering possibility that outlying popu-
lation growth in the Houston metropolitan area will constrain the growth
of the central city, ultimately creating an impoverished core on a scale
much larger than Newark.
In short, the future of American cities depends to a great extent on
their ability to absorb outlying land and communities. For the rust belt
cities that stopped expanding about a century ago, the future thus looks
bleak, and in the farther future, the Sunbelt cities may look even bleaker.
Politically fragmented metropolitan regions have higher levels of racial
and ethnic segregation, and greater levels of concentrated poverty. 26 As
Myron Orfield has summarized from nearly three decades of research:
Neighborhoods of concentrated poverty destroy the lives of the
people trapped in them and create a growing social and fiscal can-
cer in the midst of previously healthy communities. In cities and
older suburbs, as joblessness, racial segregation, and single-parent
families come to dominate neighborhoods, residents are cut off
from middle-class society and the private economy.
2 7
22. HOUSTON, supra note 20, at 6.
23. TEXAS SENATE INTERIM COMM. ON ANNEXATION, INTERIM REPORT, . 76,
at 5 (Comm. Print 1998), available at http://www.senate.state.tx.us/75r/Senate/commit/
archive/IC/IC 13REP.PDF.
24. HOUSTON QUIcKFACTS, supra note 18; Gibson, supra note 1.
25. PAUL J. MACKUN, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, POPULATION CHANGE IN
CENTRAL AND OUTLYING COUNTIES OF METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREAS: 2000 TO
2007, at 11 (2009), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2009pubs/p25-1136.pdf.
26. See RUSK, CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS, supra note 12, at 27-38; DAVID RUSK,
INSIDE GAME/OUTSIDE GAME: WINNING STRATEGIES FOR SAVING URBAN AMERICA 5
(1999) [hereinafter RUSK, WINNING STRATEGIES]; Myron Orfield, Land Use and Housing
Policies to Reduce Concentrated Poverty and Racial Segregation, 33 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 877
(2006). But see David R Morgan & Patrice Mareschal, Central-City/Suburban Inequality
and Metropolitan Political Fragmentation, 34 URB. AFF. REv. 578, 580-81 (1999).
27. MYRON ORFIELD, AMERICAN METROPOLITICS: THE NEW SUBURBAN REAL-
rrY 53-54 (2002).
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Rusk and Orfield are both proponents of central city annexation
and consolidation as a means of pursuing metropolitan policy reform,
yet, both also take it as a foregone conclusion that the chances of North-
eastern cities expanding through annexation are minimal at best. 8
Rather than suggest annexation or consolidation as a viable strategy,
Orfield has instead concentrated on the formation of coalitions of inter-
est between central cities and suburbs to promote metropolitan reform at
the state level.2 9 Rusk has argued that states should adopt laws that will
facilitate annexation and consolidation.3 ° Yet, in states where the major-
ity of the metropolitan population resides in smaller incorporated munic-
ipalities, many of which were created in part specifically to avoid
annexation, 31 it seems unlikely that elected state legislators will be moti-
vated to make laws that make it easier for cities to annex outlying
communities.
AN ALTERNATIVE REGIONALIST STRATEGY: CITIES AS FIRMs
I use Camden and the Philadelphia metropolitan region in this arti-
cle to explore an alternate path toward the revival of annexation in the
rust belt, and thus an alternate, and happier, future for rust belt cities. I
propose that the city, state, and federal officials who represent Philadel-
phia should approach elected officials in New Jersey with a plan to
redraw the Pennsylvania-New Jersey border so that Philadelphia becomes
part of New Jersey, and so that Philadelphia and Camden can be consoli-
dated into a single city. Thus absorbed into a city with a more stable tax
base and better services, Camden would finally have a clear path toward
no longer being a ward of the state. For Philadelphia, absorbing Camden
would be a major financial burden, for which it would have to be com-
pensated by including some more affluent New Jersey suburbs into the
consolidated city as well. For that purpose, the hyper-fragmentation of
northern Camden County is helpful, since smaller municipalities could
be added incrementally-starting, say, with Pennsauken, then Collings-
wood, then Merchantville, then Woodlynne, and so on-until there were
enough higher-income communities added to compensate for the tax
28. Id. at 133-35; DAVID RUSK, BALTIMORE UNBOUND: A STRATEGY FOR
REGIONAL RENEWAL 31-35 (1996) [hereinafter RUSK, BALTIMORE UNBOUND]; RUSK,
CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS, supra note 12. For critical overviews of the "new regionalist"
movement of which Rusk and Orfield are both part, see Neil Brenner, Decoding the
Newest "Metropolitan Regionalism" in the USA: A Critical Overview, 19 CrES 3, 9-17
(2002); David L. Imbroscio, Shaming the Inside Game: A Critique of the Liberal Expan-
sionist Approach to Addressing Urban Problems, 42 URB. AFF. REV. 224, 225 (2006).
29. ORFIELD, supra note 27, at 153-54.
30. RUSK, CrES WITHOUT SUBURBS, supra note 12, at 12-13.
31. For this relatively common line of argument, see, for example, JACKSON, supra
note 16, at 150-51; RUSK, WINNING STRATEGIES, supra note 28, at 35.
AMERICAN CITIES AS FIRMS IN THE 21sT CENTURY
burden of Camden, yet, not so much that their residents would have the
clout to stop the consolidation from happening (see Figure 1).
FIGURE 1: CAMDEN COUNTY AND MUNICIPALITIES
3 2
Once Philadelphia has struck a deal to be redrawn into New Jersey,
it could go back to the Pennsylvania legislature and argue that, if Penn-
32. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 2002 ECONOMIC CENSUS, CAMDEN COUNTY,
NJ-ECONOMIC PLACES, available at http://www.census.govleconlcensus02/mapslnj/0
5000us34007m.pdf.
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sylvania would like to keep its largest city, the legislature should author-
ize Philadelphia's annexation of one or more surrounding counties
(Montgomery, Bucks, or Delaware). As a city in either New Jersey or
Pennsylvania, Philadelphia would emerge from the struggle as an
expanded city with a stronger tax base, and as a more powerful political
player in whichever state it was located.
The benefits to expanding into suburban territory for Philadelphia
are conceivably significant. The city, which is also a county, sits in the
middle of a metropolitan region that covers eight other counties (four
each in New Jersey and Pennsylvania), in which there are 352 municipal-
ities.33 While the overall regional population increased by 57% between
1940 and 2000, Philadelphia's population declined by 21% during the
same period.34 Many of the people who left the city were middle-class,
with the result that many parts of Philadelphia are defined by highly
concentrated poverty. During the 1990s, for instance, the city lost
26,206 households with annual incomes between $34,000 and
$81,000.15 By 2000, the Philadelphia region stood out among similar
regions (namely Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, Minne-
apolis, Phoenix, and Pittsburgh) as having the highest percentage of poor
people living in census tracts where more than 40% of the population
qualifies by federal standards as impoverished. 36 This geographic concen-
tration of poverty is reinforced by the fact that most of the housing
options for residents below the median metropolitan income of $51,980
are located in Philadelphia, the cities of Camden and Chester, and a few
inner-ring suburbs.
Camden thus in many respects looks like an impoverished Philadel-
phia neighborhood that simply happens to be an independent city in
another state, and for that reason is all the worse off. Yet, unlike Cam-
den, Philadelphia is still a large American city, and the largest city in its
state. Its population of approximately 1.5 million residents represents
33. ADAMS ET AL., supra note 3, at 16-18 (defining the geographic region). The
U.S. Census Bureau, in fact, defines the metropolitan statistical area more broadly, as the
Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD Metropolitan Statistical Area, which
includes two additional counties. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, METROPOLITAN AND
MICROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREAS AND COMPONENTS, NOVEMBER 2008, WITH
CODES (2008), available at http:l/www.census.gov/population/www/metroareasllists/
2008/List1.txt.
34. ADAMS ET AL., supra note 3, at 16-18.
35. BROOKINGS INST. CTR. ON URBAN AND METROPOLITAN POLICY, PHILADEL-
PHIA IN Focus: A PROFILE FROM CENSUS 2000, at 56 (2003) [hereinafter BROOKINGS
INST.].
36. ADAMS ET AL., supra note 3, at 35.
37. Id. at 79-82.
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approximately 12% of the population of Pennsylvania. 8 Approximately
14% of the members of both chambers of the Pennsylvania legislature
have at least a part of Philadelphia in their districts, as do four members
of the U.S. House of Representatives.39 And while the city has lost its
middle-class population, it has maintained its large population of upper-
middle- and upper-class households-during the 1990s, it actually
gained an additional 390 households with incomes greater than
$81,000.40 In 2008, the City of Philadelphia was the fourth-largest
employer in the state, followed by the University of Pennsylvania and the
School District of Philadelphia. 4 1 The city thus has resources that pro-
vide it with influence in the state, and which I argue it could use to pique
the interests of New Jersey. In the process expand territorially, become
even more influential, and even help Camden City.
The strategy that I have so far briefly outlined here may sound out-
landish for a city, yet it is standard practice for private firms, who rou-
tinely play states and municipalities against one another in order to
extract the greatest benefits for locating in a given place. In the Philadel-
phia metropolitan region, for instance, the consulting firm Towers Perrin
"benefited from over $14 million in promised state and local government
incentives to move 1,100 employees one mile from Voorhees, New
Jersey, to Cherry Hill, New Jersey."42 In suggesting that Philadelphia
move to New Jersey, I am merely suggesting that cities act more like
private firms.
Cities, of course, already engage in ostensibly firm-like behavior.
They compete against one another for business by aggressively promoting
themselves to tourists, and by providing tax breaks and other financial
incentives so that companies will choose to locate within their jurisdic-
38. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CITY & COUNTY QuIcKFACTS, PHILADEL-
PHIA (CITY), PENNSYLVANIA, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/42/4260000.htm
(last viewed June 22, 2010).
39. For the state legislators who serve Philadelphia, see The Pennsylvania General
Assembly, Philadelphia PA County Legislators, http://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/legis/
home/findyourlegislator/countyjlist.cfm?CNTYLIST=Philadelphia (last visited Apr. 13,
2010). The four districts for the U.S. House of Representatives that include parts of
Philadelphia are the First (Rep. Robert Brady), Second (Rep. Chaka Fattah), Eighth (Rep.
Patrick Murphy), and Thirteenth (Rep. Allyson Schwartz) Districts. The majority of
Philadelphia is divided between the First and Second Districts, while the Eighth and
Thirteenth Districts include only small portions of the city. See Congressional Districts:
110th Congress-Pennsylvania, NationalAtlas.gov, http://www.nationalatlas.gov/printa-
blelimages/pdflcongdistlpagecgd 10_pa.pdf (last viewed June 22, 2010).
40. BROOKINGS INST., supra note 35, at 56.
41. PA. DEP'T OF LABOR AND INDUS., CTR. FOR WORKFORCE INFORMATION
AND ANALYSIS, PENNSYLVANIA EMPLOYERS WITH 500+ EMPLOYEES: 3RD QUARTER
(2009), available at http://www.paworkstats.state.pa.us/reports/paagg_500.pdf.
42. ADAMS ET AL., supra note 3, at 159.
2010]
108 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 24
tions, rather than in another city.43 In the classic argument by economist
Charles Tiebout, cities operate as firms by providing unique bundles of
services that match the preferences of specific "consumer voters." 44 As
the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations analogized,
"[jiust as market competition produces an economic system responsive to
consumer needs, interjurisdictional competition can produce a govern-
ment system responsive to voter desires."
4 5
Yet, such interjurisdictional, intercity competition for tourist dol-
lars, residents, or new industry is only superficially firm-like because it is
competition premised on the very thing that distinguishes municipal
from private corporations-namely, mobility. Cities will never be mobile
in the same way as firms. Philadelphia is never going to open up a new
branch city in Arizona to better compete against Phoenix, for example.
But the success of cities lies in their relative ability to expand through
consolidation or annexation, 46 which makes cities more mobile in the
sense that they can move across space, even as they are tethered to their
original locations. Thus, when I say in this article that cities might oper-
ate as firms, I am not suggesting new ways in which they might better
compete against one another, but how they might benefit from intergov-
ernmental competition itself.
In short, I propose and argue herein that, in the twenty-first cen-
tury, traditional large American cities might take a more active role in
reinventing American federalism by leveraging what influence they have
to try to force state border changes to their advantage. There are at least
three reasons for making this argument. First, I am proposing this strat-
egy as an alternative and extension of the metropolitan reform strategies
proposed by Rusk and Orfield. Like them, the strategy that I propose
here is one of coalition-building for regional reform that attempts to lev-
43. For one of the classic statements on this strategy, see James M. Buchanan,
Principles of Urban Fiscal Strategy, 11 PUB. CHOICE 1 (1971); see also Harvey Molotch,
The City as a Growth Machine: Toward a Political Economy of Place, 82 AM. J. Soc. 309
(1976).
44. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON.
416 (1956).
45. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, INTERJURIS-
DICTIONAL TAx AND POLICY COMPETITION: GOOD OR BAD FOR THE FEDERAL SYSTEM?
(1991), quoted in John D. Donahue, Tiebout? Or Not Tiebout? The Market Metaphor and
America's Devolution Debate, 11 J. EcON. PERSP. 73, 74 (1997).
46. Many authors distinguish between annexation and consolidation, though the
distinction is not always consistent. For instance, Kenneth Jackson refers to annexation as
"the addition of unincorporated land to the city" and to consolidation as "the absorption
of one municipal government by another, usually adjacent .... JACKSON, supra note 16,
at 140-41. Orfield defines annexation as "the power granted to cities in some states to
expand their boundaries to capture undeveloped land, unincorporated areas, or existing
communities" and consolidation as "joining multiple jurisdictions into one larger juris-
diction." ORFIELD, supra note 27, at 133, 135. Given the overlap and lack of consistency
in the distinction annexation and consolidation, I use the two terms interchangeably here.
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erage the perceived self-interests of the actors involved. As Rusk has
explained, one of the key lessons from Orfield's attempt to create greater
inter-municipal coordination and equity in the Twin Cities region during
his time in the Minnesota legislature, is that "communities seldom make
progress on hard, divisive issues through friendly, consensual agreement.
They do so by building political coalitions. And those coalitions are most
durable when based on each member's political self-interest-that is,
their perception of the interests of the constituencies they represent."4 7
Yet, unlike Rusk and Orfield, whose regionalist strategies are premised on
building coalitions of groups within central cities and suburbs by demon-
strating to them the collective benefits of regional reform, my strategy
relies on building coalitions between central cities and statewide political
party interests-both within states, and across state borders-substantial
enough to simply overrule the interests of surrounding suburbs. The
goals of my strategy are also somewhat different. Rusk and Orfield have
proposed regional reforms that directly address racial and economic ine-
qualities that are in part a function of metropolitan fragmentation (for
instance, "fair share" affordable housing and tax-base-sharing pro-
grams).4 8 My strategy directly addresses metropolitan fragmentation
through central-city annexation, with the expectation and hope that
larger cities, and thus less fragmented metropolitan areas, will result in
greater equity.
Second, the strategy I propose here is theoretically significant
because it reverses the traditional understanding that stat government
limits cities' ability to expand. As I explain in greater detail in the follow-
ing section, the strategy I describe here relies not on the formal legal
powers of cities, which are, of course, limited, but on their informal pow-
ers, primarily as political units often dominated by a single party.
Third, regardless of whether or not my proposed strategy is a viable
option for cities-which it most likely is not-it is still, at least, an
important thought experiment, because it allows for a rigorous re-imagi-
nation of our big cities as political units independent of the states with
which they are usually associated. It thus takes up Gerald Frug's long-
standing claim that "the powerlessness of cities has become so basic to
our current way of understanding American society that no modest effort
to 'revitalize' the cities by decentralizing power can succeed. Real decen-
tralization requires rethinking and, ultimately, restructuring American
society itself."49 Indeed, I argue in the conclusion of this article that the
ultimate and logical extension of thinking seriously of cities as political
units independent and powerful enough to compel state border changes,
47. RusK, WINNING STRATEGIES, supra note 26, at 247.
48. Id. at 230, 238-42; ORFIELD, supra note 27, at 105-08.
49. Gerald Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HAv. L. REv. 1059, 1060
(1980).
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is a call for a new constitutional convention, in recognition of the fact
that the United States has evolved from a primarily rural to a primarily
urban nation since 1787. Yet, while a restructuring along the lines sug-
gested by Frug is thus implicit in the strategy I propose, I only scratch the
surface of what would actually be involved in a state border change and
municipal consolidation. I concentrate primarily on the political motiva-
tions of the numerous state, local, and national officials who would have
to approve the border change and consolidation, and I do not address at
all the gargantuan work of consolidating administrative departments,
information systems, pension funds, labor agreements, and the like.
While the strategy I propose here thus has broader significance
beyond the Philadelphia metropolitan region, it is also obviously a practi-
cal strategy only for big cities that lie along state borders, such as New
York, Chicago, St. Louis, Cincinnati, and Kansas City, Missouri. Of all
those cities, Philadelphia makes a good case because it falls into the mid-
dle of the pack in terms of its post-World War II development. As Table
1 indicates, all six cities suffered their greatest period of population loss
in the 1970s, with Philadelphia losing a greater proportion of its popula-
tion than either Chicago or New York, but less than Cincinnati or St.
Louis, and about the same as in Kansas City. Like Cincinnati and St.
Louis, Philadelphia continued to lose population in the 1990s, but at a
much slower rate than those two cities, thus making it a bit more similar
to Kansas City and Chicago, both of which made modest population
gains in that decade. And like New York and Chicago, Philadelphia,
despite its population loss, has maintained its status as a major American
city, having dropped from third- to fifth-largest American city between
1950 and 2000. By contrast, during that same period, St. Louis dropped
from eight- to forty-eighth-largest American city, Kansas City dropped
from twentieth to thirty-sixth, and Cincinnati dropped from eighteenth
to fifty-third. 5
0
50. Kansas City's notable ability to avoid the kind of devastating population loss
that Cincinnati and St. Louis experienced in the 1960s, and to actually gain population
during that decade, was due to massive geographic expansion. Between 1940 and 1970,
Kansas City grew from 58.6 to 316.3 square miles. Tellingly, the city suffered from popu-
lation loss in the first decade, the 1970s, when it was unable to annex any outlying land.
U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CITIES WITH 100,000 OR MORE POPULATION IN 2000
RANKED BY POPULATION, 2000 IN RANK ORDER, http://www.census.gov/statab/ccdb/
citl020r.txt (last visited, March 19, 2010) [hereinafter CENSUS, CITIES WITH 100,000
OR MORE] (providing population data for 2000).
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As a major American city, Philadelphia thus likely maintains
enough resources-especially, as I will explain below, in terms of popula-
tion and votes-that it can influence policy at the state and national
level. Indeed, it would have to do so in order to effect a border change
between Pennsylvania and New Jersey. Furthermore, it has the motiva-
tion to do so because it has suffered in the same ways as other rust belt
cities such as Cincinnati and St. Louis. St. Louis and Cincinnati, on the
other hand, may have lost the kind of resources that they would need to
bargain for a state boundary change. Meanwhile, New York and Chicago
are successful enough that they would have no motivation to engage in
such a dramatic and energy-intensive initiative. Philadelphia thus at least
serves as a good test case that can be extended to other cities as a way to
test the more general applicability of the expansionist strategy I will
sketch out in some detail below.
If the idea that a city might be able to compel a state border change
sounds simply too unrealistic, consider that, in 2001, the U.S. House of
Representatives voted in favor of redrawing part of the Utah-Nevada bor-
der so that the city of Wendover might become part of Nevada rather
than Utah, and thus consolidate with its neighbor, West Wendover,
Nevada. The rationale was quite clear. West Wendover, being in Nevada,
had gambling and liquor, and a vibrant tourist trade, and thus had
enough local tax revenues to support good public services-most notably
a school district.52 Wendover, on the other hand, was a smaller, poorer
community, in large part because anyone with any means had moved to
West Wendover. Feeling arbitrarily denied adequate local services because
of an arbitrary state border, Wendover's residents appealed to their
House representative, James Hansen, who sponsored a bill, HR 2054, to
redraw the state border." As amended in the House Judiciary Commit-
tee, HR 2054 specified, among other things, that for the consolidation of
the two Wendovers to take effect, the proposal required approval by acts
of the legislatures of both Nevada and Utah; a majority vote of the
residents of both cities during a general election for Federal office; and,
because it was an interstate compact, by virtue of article I, section 10,
clause 3 of the United States Constitution, it required approval by Con-
gress and the President. 54
In contrast to Wendover, the officials and business owners in West
Wendover were hesitant to consolidate with a city that brought little in
new tax revenues, would create new competition for existing casino own-
52. H.R. REP. No. 107-469, at 3 (2002).
53. H.R. 2054, 107th Cong. (2001).
54. H.R. REP. No. 107-469, at 2; see also Daniel Levin & Bryan Thiriot, Line
Dancing: Municipal Unification Across a State Border (paper presented at the annual
meeting of the Western Political Science Association, Portland, Or., March 11-14, 2004)
(on file with author).
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ers, and was also in debt.5 5 Possibly for all those reasons, the proposal was
left to die in committee in the Senate. Yet, the proposed boundary
change is still instructive for at least two reasons. First, the resistance to
consolidation in West Wendover was due to the fact that West Wendover
and Nevada would be absorbing a new city that was a new financial
burden. For that reason, the strategy I sketch out here begins with a
proposal to annex Philadelphia to New Jersey, rather than Camden to
Pennsylvania, for which there would be no incentive on the part of Penn-
sylvania officials or residents. As I explain below, annexing Philadelphia
to New Jersey would work in the interests of different factions in both
states, most notably Democrats in New Jersey and Republicans in Penn-
sylvania, and for that reason the proposal would provide Philadelphia
with significant bargaining power, especially with Democrats in Penn-
sylvania. Second, the annexation of Wendover to Nevada was of little
political import to elected officials in either state-the towns are isolated
and their combined population was approximately 6,500 56-who thus
had little motivation to pursue the proposal past what appears to have
been a largely perfunctory approval in the House. By contrast, the propo-
sal to move Philadelphia to New Jersey involves the movement from one
state to another of more than a million residents, represented by elected
officials at the city, state, and national levels, whose electoral districts
would be significantly affected. Yet, it is precisely because of the dramatic
impact that it would have that the proposal generates the kind of incen-
tives, described in more detail below, necessary to bring about such a
significant institutional change.
Prior to a detailed description of the motivational calculus that
might create the necessary incentives for actors actually to carry through
with a such a border change, the following section provides a brief discus-
sion of how the proposal fits into a larger debate over the relationship
between state law and local annexation-and more generally, the relative
discretion that cities have in relation to state government.
CITIES, STATES, AND ANNEXATION
Scholars have long held that the final blow to city autonomy came
with the hegemony of John's Dillon's influential opinion that cities had
no power independent of state law. 57 As William Munro noted in his
influential 1923 text on American municipal government, "Dillon's
55. Tom Gorman, 2 Towns' Great Divide: Poor Utah City Wants to Unite With Its
Richer Nevada Half To Work, The State Line Will Have to be Shifted a Bit, L.A. TIMES,
May 28, 2001, at A12.
56. Id.
57. See, e.g., City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids & Missouri R.R. Co., 24 Iowa 455
(1868), quoted in ANWAR SvuD, POLITICAL THEORY OF AMERIcAN LOCAL GovERN-
MENT 68 (1966). See also JOHN DILLON, THE LAw OF MUINICIPAL CORPORATIONS 143
(2d ed. 1873).
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Rule" was "so well recognized that it is not nowadays open to ques-
tion." 8 Yet, the focus on Dillon's Rule has obscured the fact that state
law is often simply an expression of local interest. I have argued else-
where, for instance, that, in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
central city efforts to annex outlying communities, and suburban efforts
to remain independent, were primarily local conflicts, the outcomes of
which often depended on the actual physical capacities of suburban
municipalities to independently supply themselves with public services
such as water and sewerage.59 Annexation efforts certainly required some
level of state authorization, such as the requirement that annexation be
approved in referendums in all affected communities, but that state
action was usually the result of local actors; beyond serving as a non-local
venue for local negotiations, legislatures usually did not intervene in
municipal border disputes in any meaningful sense.
60
In direct response, legal scholars and regionalists such as Rusk have
contended that I have ignored the significance of state law. Nicole Stelle
Garnett argued, for instance, that my argument "fails to appreciate the
importance of the emerging [state] legislative deference to suburban
political autonomy. " 61 Rusk claimed that "[s]tate law shapes whether a
region will be highly fragmented ... or relatively unified .... Legislatures
create the skeleton; public works merely add the sinews." 62 And Gerald
Frug contended that "the decision about whether to consolidate or
remain independent was not (and is not) up to the suburbs. The suburbs
had a voice in the matter only if the state legislature gave them one."63
Yet there is in fact little empirical evidence that state law has, or ever has
had, any consistent or strong impact on local annexation activity. In a
recent and comprehensive review of the literature, for instance, Mary
Edwards has noted that earlier studies from the 1960s and 1970s "found
no consistent relationship between the restrictiveness of state annexation
law and annexation activity," while more recent studies have found
inconsistent and inexplicable relationships. 64 Jered Carr and Richard
Feiock found, in the case of annexations in the 1990s, that most state
laws ostensibly designed to make annexations more procedurally difficult
58. GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT
BUILDING WALLS 49-50 (1999) (quoting WILLIAM MUNRO, THE GOVERNMENT OF
AMERICAN CITIES 53 (1923)).
59. DILWORTH, supra note 17, at 91-92.
60. Id.
61. Nicole Stelle Garnett, Unsubsidizing Suburbia, 90 MINN. L. REv. 459, 471
(2005) (reviewing DILWORTH, supra note 17).
62. Rusk, Book Review, supra note 18.
63. Gerald Frug, Book Review, 5 CITY & COMMUNITY 348 (2006) (reviewing
DILWORTH, supra note 17).
64. Mary M. Edwards, Understanding the Complexities of Annexation, 2 J. PLAN.
LITERATURE 119, 125 (2008).
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were actually related to an increase in the frequency of annexations.6 5
Rex Facer, testing the impact of 15 different state provisions relating to
annexation on the annual volume of annexation activity during the
1990s, found that, while state provisions ostensibly designed to facilitate
annexation were generally associated with more annexation activity, state
provisions designed to constrain annexations had no impact on annexa-
tion activity.6 6 The relationships uncovered between state law and annex-
ation also tend to be of relatively minimal explanatory power, statistically
speaking, thus leaving much to be explained about how and why cities
annex outlying land.67
One outstanding example that refutes the idea that states com-
pletely determine local annexation activity is Milwaukee, one of the few
traditional big industrial cities to expand significantly after World War II.
Milwaukee's ability to expand had little to do with state laws, but was
instead the product of city officials' determination that they were going
to annex outlying land. Thus the Milwaukee Common Council in 1946
created the Department of Abstracting and Annexation, through which it
expanded the city's territory by an additional 36 square miles by 1957,
nearly doubling its pre-war size.6 8 One of the department's chief jobs was
to lead coordinated campaigns in suburban municipalities targeted for
annexation, convincing suburban residents of annexation's benefits, and
getting a majority of those residents to sign petitions approving annexa-
tion, as required by state law.6 9 State law did not in this instance impede
central city annexation, as Rusk and others suggest, though it was cer-
tainly a consideration in Milwaukee's annexation strategy. Similarly, the
annexation strategy I sketch below takes state law and legislators into
consideration, though those laws and legislators do not determine the
strategy.
The evidence suggests at least that state annexation laws leave ample
room for local governments to negotiate and maneuver in order to
65. Jered B. Carr & Richard C. Feiock, State Annexation 'Constraints' and the Fre-
quency of Municipal Annexation, 54 POL. RES. Q. 459, 466 (2001).
66. Rex L. Facer, II, Annexation Activity and State Law in the United States, 41
URB. AFF. REv. 697 (2006).
67. Of the relatively more recent studies, only that of Gaines Liner includes a
measure of the extent to which the independent variables in his statistical model account
for the variation in his dependent variable (annexation). In Liner's model, this measure,
known as an R2 or adjusted R2, was 0.105, meaning that the independent variables
(including state law) explained only 10% of the variation in the dependent variable,
which thus suggests that there is a good deal more to be explained. Gaines Liner, Institu-
tional Constraints and Annexation Activity in the U.S. in the 1970s, 30 URB. STuD. 1371,
1378 (1993); see also Fleischmann, supra note 20, at 129 (commenting on low explana-
tory power with regard to Thomas R. Dye, Urban Political Integration: Conditions Associ-
ated With Annexation in American Cities, 8 MIDWEST J. OF POL. Sci. 430 (1964)).
68. Joel Rast, Annexation Policy in Milwaukee: An Historical Institutionalist
Approach, 39 POLITY 55, 55-56, 65, 70 (2007).
69. Id. at 67-68.
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attempt to annex outlying territory (and for suburban communities to do
the same to try to remain independent). My proposed strategy for con-
solidating Philadelphia and Camden relies precisely on the capability of
cities to operate as such bargaining units, though my proposal is wider in
its scope because it also suggests altering a state border. Key to imple-
menting such a strategy, I argue, is forging favorable majorities at the
local, state, and national levels, and in the next section of this article I
sketch out a strategy for forging such majorities.
PHILADELPHIA, NJ OR PA?
Key to successfully consolidating Philadelphia with Camden City
and its surrounding suburbs, and moving Philadelphia to New Jersey
through a state border change, is structuring the proposal so that it bene-
fits a majority of the relevant stakeholders and decision-makers at local,
state, and national levels, while also avoiding or overcoming key veto
players. Among these stakeholders, decision-makers, and veto players, the
residents of the municipalities to be consolidated, who would undoubt-
edly have to vote to approve the measure, are the most inscrutable. They
are numerous, diverse, and do not fit into institutional categories for
which there are readily definable benefits. 70 Certainly, the residents of
Philadelphia would receive some benefits as citizens of New Jersey that
they do not currently get as Pennsylvanians, such as stricter gun laws,
71
yet whether that would be enough of an incentive to overcome other real
or perceived negative factors depends on a host of other, mostly
unknown, variables.
Attempts to assess the specific costs and benefits of a consolidation
or annexation, much less how those costs and benefits are perceived by
voters who have imperfect information, are usually exercises in futility, as
70. For studies that attempt to define the specific benefits different actors would
receive from annexation, see Richard C. Feiock & Jered B. Carr, Incentives, Entrepreneurs,
and Boundary Change: A Collective Action Framework, 36 URB. AFF. REv. 382 (2001). See
also DiLwoRTH, supra note 17, at 12-32.
71. Philadelphia has had a long-standing conflict with the state over gun control
laws. The city has twice attempted to pass local ordinances that would have created more
stringent gun control requirements, and both times has had the ordinances struck down
by state courts because the ordinances contradicted state restrictions against local gun
control as specified in the Uniform Firearms Act. By contrast, in New Jersey, state courts
have also overturned local gun control ordinances, such as one in Jersey City that limited
gun sales to any one person to a maximum of one a month. But the New Jersey legisla-
ture, which is more amenable to gun control, has responded by making those limits state
laws. On the conflict between Philadelphia and Pennsylvania, see Clarke v. House of
Representatives, 957 A.2d 361 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2008); Chris Brennan, Philly Clout
Blog, PHILADELPHIA DAiLY NEws, Council Challenges Court Ruling on Local Gun Laws
(Oct. 28, 2008), available at http://www.philly.com/philly/blogs/cityhall/Council-Chal-
lenges_.CourtRulingOnLocalGunLaws.html. See 18 Pa. Code §§ 908, 6105, 6110,
and 6111, for Pennsylvania's gun control laws. See N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2C:39-1, et seq.,
and 2C:58-1, et seq. (West 2010) for New Jersey's gun control laws.
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previous authors have noted.72 Yet, what does seem likely is that the
greatest resistance to the proposed consolidation will come from subur-
ban residents in Camden County who, because their municipalities are
included in the consolidation plan, stand to lose independent school dis-
tricts and other services, and who are in general most likely to be predis-
posed to oppose annexation. Previous researchers have found, for
instance, that opponents of consolidation tend most often to be "lower
middle-class and working-class voters outside the central city who per-
ceive consolidation both as an encroachment of urban culture and as an
instrument of middle-class values."7 3 Of the thirty-seven municipalities
in Camden County, twenty-one have disproportionately more middle-
income households (those in the middle three income quintiles for the
region) than in the Philadelphia metropolitan region overall. 74
If residents voted on the consolidation plan in separate elections in
each of the municipalities included in the consolidation plan, and if each
election had to show a majority in favor of consolidation, then the plan
would no doubt be doomed. New Jersey residents in the municipalities
surrounding Camden City would vote by majorities against consolida-
tion and their municipalities would then be excluded from the plan. Phil-
adelphia residents, expecting suburbanites in Camden County to reject
consolidation, would most likely also reject the consolidation plan, since
they would expect it to only include Camden City. However, if the New
Jersey legislature authorized only a single election in the Camden County
municipalities to be consolidated, where the votes from all municipalities
were counted together, votes of approval from Camden City would most
likely overwhelm suburban votes against consolidation. Expecting such
an outcome, Philadelphia residents would thus also be more likely to
approve the border change and consolidation.
A vote on consolidation in which the votes from all affected munici-
palities are counted together is certainly less common than counting the
votes from each municipality separately, but it has been used in the past,
specifically to override negative votes in smaller suburban communities.
Such was the case with the municipal consolidation that created the five-
borough system that is New York City. After prodding by the New York
State Chamber of Commerce and other reform-oriented groups, the New
72. See DILWORTH, supra note 16, at 57. See also DAWnD C. HAMMACK, POWER
AND SocIETY: GREATER NEW YoRK AT THE TuRN OF THE CENTURY 187 (1982).
73. William Lyons & John M. Scheb II, Saying "No" One More Time: The Rejec-
tion of Consolidated Government in Knox County, Tennessee, 30 ST. & Loc. GOV'T. REV.
92, 94 (1998).
74. Measure of middle incomes, and the family income data for Camden County,
comes from the Metropolitan Philadelphia Indicators Project, Where We Stand: Commu-
nity Indicators for Metropolitan Philadelphia 36 (2006), available at http://mpip.temple.
edu/mpip/2006ReportPDF/2006_MPIPAnnual.pdf. For the municipalities in Camden
County, see Camden County: Municipalities, http://www.camdencounty.com/govern-
mentlabout-camden-county/municipalities (last visited June 22, 2010).
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York legislature in 1890 created a Consolidation Inquiry Commission,
which recommended, and the legislature approved, a referendum during
the 1894 state general election, asking residents of twenty municipalities
in four of the counties surrounding Manhattan whether they would like
to be included as part of a consolidated "Greater New York." Several
municipalities, such as the towns of Flushing and Westchester, voted
against consolidation, yet the legislature used the overall majority vote in
favor of consolidation as justification for consolidating all of the munici-
palities that voted on the issue in 1894. Indeed, New York state Republi-
cans, thinking that New York City Democrats might lose control of an
enlarged city, pushed the consolidation through the legislature, over the
objections of the mayors of New York and Brooklyn, among others.7 5
Much as Republican legislators supported the creation of Greater
New York because they thought it would help their party, so would con-
temporary Democratic legislators in New Jersey likely support the adop-
tion of Philadelphia, because it would vastly increase Democratic support
in their state. As of January 2010, 79% of the 1,056,519 registered voters
in Philadelphia were registered as Democrats.7 6 Were those voters added
to New Jersey (and were they to maintain the same party affiliations), the
composition of New Jersey's registered voters would shift from being
34% Democratic, 20% Republican, and 46% unaffiliated (as of June
2009), to 41% Democratic, 19% Republican, and 40% unaffiliated.77
Pennsylvania's legislators would, of course, also have to approve the state
border change, the motivations for which are the mirror image of those
in New Jersey. Just as gaining Philadelphia would be a boon to New
Jersey Democrats, losing the city would be to the advantage of Penn-
sylvania Republicans, who are numerous enough in the legislature that
they could likely achieve majority votes for the measure in both cham-
bers, as explained below.
In the 2010-2011 session of the New Jersey legislature, Democrats
have a 46-33 majority in the House and a 23-17 majority in the Senate,
and thus enough to approve a consolidation referendum and border
75. On the creation of Greater New York, see DILWORTH, supra note 17, at
66-68; HAMMACK, supra note 72; and ALBERT E. HENSCHEL, MUNICIPAL CONSOLIDA-
TION: HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE GREATER NEW YORK (1895).
76. See PA. DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF COMMISSIONS, ELECTIONS & LEGISLA-
TION, Div. OF COMMISSIONs/ELECTIONS, VOTER REGISTRATION STATISTICS, available
at http://www.dos.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/voter-registration-statistics/
12725 (follow the "Current Voter Registration Statistics" hyperlink) [hereinafter PA
DEP'T OF STATE, STATISTICS].
77. These figures were calculated using id., and N.J. DEP'T OF STATE, DviSION
OF ELECTIONS, STATEWIDE VOTER REGISTRATION SUMMARY (June 3, 2009) available at
http://www.state.nj.us/state/elections/2009results/09primary/pri-elect-couny-registra-
tion-summary-060309.pdf.
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change, at least through a straight party-line vote.78 Republicans in Penn-
sylvania have a 30-20 majority in the state senate, though they have a
96-103 minority in the House.7 9 The Democratic majority in the House
would likely be overcome, however, since twenty-four of the House
Democrats (in addition to four House Republicans) represent districts in
Philadelphia,80 and at least the majority of them would likely receive
better positions as New Jersey legislators than those they currently have
in Pennsylvania given that legislative districts in New Jersey include
approximately 210,359 people, while Pennsylvania House districts
include approximately 60,497 people.8 1
To ensure that the absorption of Philadelphia did not disrupt
existing electoral districts and thus threaten sitting legislators, New
Jersey's Constitution would have to be amended to allow for more than
the current forty electoral districts, each of which elects one state senator
and two state representatives. 82 If Philadelphia were divided into districts
equal in size to the current legislative districts in New Jersey, it would
create approximately seven new districts, from which fourteen representa-
tives and seven senators would be elected. Seven of Pennsylvania's sena-
tors have districts in Philadelphia,8 3 and they could thus all be transferred
into the New Jersey legislature, while there would only be space for four-
teen of the twenty-eight representatives whose districts are in Philadel-
phia. New Jersey Democrats would thus have to offer nominations to run
for the New Jersey House to fourteen of the Democratic Pennsylvania
representatives from Philadelphia, once they became New Jersey residents
(and once the new districts were created), in exchange for them voting
for the state border change in the Pennsylvania House. The four Penn-
78. For a list of New Jersey legislators and their party affiliations, see New Jersey
Legislature, Legislative Roster, http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/members/roster.asp (last vis-
ited Apr. 20, 2010).
79. For a list of members of the Pennsylvania State Senate with party affiliations,
see Pennsylvania State Senate, Members of the Senate, http://www.legis.state.pa.us/
cfdocs/legis/home/member information/senators -alpha.cfm (last visited Apr. 20, 2010);
for a list of members of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives, with party affiliations,
see Pennsylvania House of Representatives, http://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/legis/
home/memberinformation/representatives-alpha.cfm (last visited Apr. 20, 2010). The
Pennsylvania House of Representatives has 203 seats, though the number of actual repre-
sentatives is sometimes lower due to vacancies.
80. For a list of Pennsylvania House members who represent Philadelphia, see
Pennsylvania General Assembly, supra note 36.
81. U.S. BuEAU OF THE CENSUS, STATE & COUNTY QuIcKFACTS, PENN-
sYLvAl.,tA, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/42000.html (last visited June 22,
2010); U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATE & COUNTY QUICKFAcTS, NEW JERSEY,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/34000.html. District population estimates use
population data from the 2000 Census, which was the last time the districts were
redrawn.
82. N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cls. 1-3.
83. See Pennsylvania General Assembly, supra note 39.
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sylvania House Republicans who represent Philadelphia, and who could
expect to lose their seats, could be expected to side with the majority of
Democrats and vote against the border change, though that would still
leave a net gain of ten votes in favor of the border change from Demo-
crats who would become representatives of larger districts in New Jersey,
and in a more Democratic state.
In New Jersey, a constitutional amendment, such as would be
required to increase the number of state legislative districts, requires
three-fifths approval by the House and Senate, or majority approval in
both chambers in two consecutive years, after which the state's voters
must approve the measure at the next general election. 84 The actual state
border change and municipal consolidation, however, do not require a
constitutional amendment. After the border change has been approved
by a simple majority vote in both the Pennsylvania and New Jersey legis-
latures, and in the United States Congress (discussed later), both Repub-
lican and Democratic New Jersey legislators will have a strong incentive
to approve the increase in electoral districts, and voters would likely fol-
low suit. Without such a change to the state constitution, the border
change would require that each of the existing forty New Jersey legislative
districts be radically redrawn after the state's population had increased by
approximately 1.5 million overnight, and in only one relatively small
area, which would threaten the seat of every sitting legislator. Legislative
districts in Pennsylvania would also have to change dramatically with the
loss of Philadelphia, but there legislators would face the happy outcome
of having to draw their districts smaller, thus better encapsulating their
core constituents (with the help of a friendly redistricting commission in
what would at that point be a one-party state), to make room for more
Republican representatives and senators.
Yet, legislative approval of the consolidation and border change
would likely be followed by a gubernatorial veto in both states, since the
current Republican governor of New Jersey would object to a border
change that would make his state more Democratic, as would the Demo-
cratic governor of Pennsylvania object to making his state more Republi-
can. The consolidation plan would then have to wait for the unlikely
moment when there was a Republican governor of Pennsylvania and a
Democratic governor of New Jersey, at the same time as the New Jersey
and Pennsylvania legislatures maintain their respective Democratic and
Republican majorities. In only three years since the end of World War II
have the New Jersey governorship and both chambers of the legislature
been controlled by Democrats at the same time as the Pennsylvania gov-
ernorship and both chambers of the legislature been controlled by
84. N.J. CONST. art. IX..
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Republicans.85 Alternatively, Democratic legislators in New Jersey and
Republican legislators in Pennsylvania could attempt to win votes across
their respective aisles, through earmarks and other divisible benefits, in
order to build coalitions large enough to override gubernatorial vetoes.8 6
In New Jersey, assuming an otherwise straight party-line vote, Democrats
would need to thus successfully entice four Republican senators and eight
representatives to cross over and vote for the consolidation and border
change proposal; and in Pennsylvania, Republicans would need to entice
thirty-one Democratic representatives.8 7 Assuming the Pennsylvania
Republican senators would already be joined in supporting the proposal
by the seven Democratic senators from Philadelphia who could expect to
become New Jersey senators, as explained above, there would already be a
veto-proof majority in the Pennsylvania Senate.
Though the largest apparent hurdle to winning enough votes for a
veto-proof majority lies in the Pennsylvania House of Representatives,
these legislators' small districts would suggest that they could be relatively
easily enticed to vote for consolidation. In fact, Democratic representa-
tives who are not from Philadelphia may side with Republicans without
any inducement, based on a notorious "anti-Philadelphia" bias that has
been known to cut across traditional partisan cleavages. As one long-time
Pennsylvania journalist described the situation in the 1970s:
The Philadelphians are politically aggressive, if only because of
ethnic and racial minority demands .... The besieged Philadel-
phia School District could gobble up the state's entire educational
appropriation and still need more.... Many maintain that Phila-
delphia, or the Delaware Valley, ought to be a state unto itself.
Short of that, the politicians try to cope with the conflict.
88
At least one final concern at the state legislative level in New Jersey
is the electoral consequence of approving the border change and munici-
pal consolidation referendum (designed so that Camden City voters out-
numbered suburban voters) for the legislators whose districts cover the
municipalities to be consolidated. These legislators may well have at least
85. For histories of the partisan control of the Pennsylvania and New Jersey legisla-
tures and for lists of governors, see 119 PENNSYLVANIA MANUAL, § 3-273 to -275, 4-21
to -22 (2009); MANUAL OF THE LEGISLATURE OF NEW JERSEY 306-09 (2009).
86. On the use of earmarks and other divisible benefits for coalition building gen-
erally, and as applied to the United States Congress, see generally DIANA EVANS, GREAS-
ING THE WHEELS: USING PORK BARREL PROJECTS TO BUILD MAJORITY COALITIONS IN
CONGRESS (2004).
87. These figures assume the current vacancies in the Pennsylvania House of Rep-
resentatives and that the Republicans would have already won over the fourteen Demo-
crats who would expect to become New Jersey legislators, as described earlier.
88. PAUL B. BEERS, PENNSYLVANIA POLITIcs TODAY AND YESTERDAY: THE TOL-
ERABLE ACCOMMODATION 10 (1980); see also Angela Couloumbis, Nutter's Uphill Battle
in Harrisburg, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, May 25, 2009, at BI (describing another
instance of anti-Philadelphia sentiment in the Pennsylvania General Assembly).
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a weak veto power over state approval of the consolidation referendum
since they represent the affected municipalities, and legislators from else-
where in the state may defer to them on local issues. The legislators who
represent municipalities in Camden County are in any case almost all
Democrats, so their votes are crucial to a veto-proof majority. Yet, these
legislators can also expect to lose all votes in the next general election in
the suburban municipalities included in the consolidation plan, and they
might understandably thus vote against the consolidation and border
change proposal in order to protect their own seats.
There are at least two possible strategies for minimizing the impact
of the consolidation and border change on the electoral fortunes of the
legislators who represent the municipalities to be consolidated. On the
one hand, the consolidation plan might include only municipalities in a
single electoral district-namely the Fifth District, since that includes
Camden City-in order to minimize the number of legislators directly
affected by the plan. It seems likely that, after the approval of the consoli-
dation plan, the legislators from the Fifth District will maintain their
electoral support in Camden City, but lose all their previous electoral
support in the suburban municipalities to be consolidated. Thus, only so
many suburban municipalities should be included in the consolidation
plan, the total likely votes from which (all of which, we assume, would be
against the sitting legislator after the consolidation vote) would be less
than the expected votes for the sitting legislator from Camden City and
unaffected suburban municipalities (those not included in the consolida-
tion plan). For example, in the last state senate election in the Fifth Dis-
trict (which includes Camden City, Gloucester City, the boroughs of
Woodlynne, Mount Ephraim, Audobon, Haddon Heights, Bellmawr,
Barrington, Lawnside, Magnolia, Somerdale, Stratford, and several other
municipalities in Gloucester County), in 2007, the winning candidate,
Dana Redd, received 16,918 votes, while her opponent, Hans Berg,
received 9,983 votes. 89 If Redd (who resigned from the senate after being
elected mayor of Camden City) voted for the consolidation and border
change, and if we assumed that (1) in the next senate election she would
lose all votes previously cast for her in the suburban districts to be consol-
idated, and (2) that the suburban votes she lost would all be cast instead
for an opponent who would have otherwise received the same number of
votes as Berg did in 2007, then the consolidation plan should include as
many contiguous suburban municipalities as collectively cast votes for
Redd equal to one less than half her 2007 margin of victory over Berg, or
89. N.J. DEPr. OF STATE, DviSION OF ELECTIONS, OFFIcIAL GENERAL ELEC-
TION RESULTS BY LEGISLATIVE DisTicrs: FIFTH LEGISLATIVE Disnuc-r (2007), availa-
ble at http://www.state.nj.us/state/clections/2007results/07general-election/Results-by-
leg-district/2007-5th-leg-district-by-municipality.pdf.
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3,467 votes.9" As a rough measure of the number of municipalities that
could be thus included in the proposed consolidation, Gloucester City,
Mount Ephraim, Audobon, Haddon Heights, and Woodlynne collec-
tively cast 3,141 votes for Redd in 2007. 9 1
Alternately, the municipalities to be included in the consolidation
plan might each be in separate legislative districts, which would affect
more legislators, but which would minimize the impact to each legislative
district. For instance, the municipalities to be consolidated might include
Camden City and Woodlynne Borough in the Fifth District; Collings-
wood Borough, Oaklyn Borough, and Haddon Township in the Sixth
District; and Pennsauken Township and Merchantville Borough in the
Seventh District. In this case, using the 2007 state senate race as before,
the senator from the Fifth District would lose only 103 votes in the next
election. In the Sixth District, where in 2007 John Adler won against
Joseph Adolf by 25,737 to 15,846, Adler would receive 22,028 votes and
Adolf 19,555 in a race after consolidation.9 2 In the Seventh District, after
consolidation, the current senator, Diane Allen, could expect to lose her
90. That is, every vote Redd would lose in the affected suburban municipalities
after the consolidation referendum would be a vote gained for Berg, creating a two-point
spread between the candidates in favor of Berg. Thus a loss of votes equal to half of
Redd's margin of victory in 2007 would result in a tie between Redd and Berg, while a
loss of votes equal to one less than half of Redd's margin of victory, would be the maxi-
mum amount of votes Redd could lose while still winning (though in reality this margin
would likely result in Berg calling for a recount).
91. Id. Similar calculations for New Jersey House elections are complicated by the
fact that voters each vote for two House candidates, and thus the number of votes a
representative would lose to an opponent for approving the consolidation plan depends
both on how many votes were cast for them in the previous election and on who else the
voter voted for. For instance, the two winning candidates for House seats in 2009 in the
Fifth District were Donald Norcross and Angel Fuentes, while Brian Kluchnick came in
third. If we make the same assumptions as in the case of the senate race above, and if we
assume the same suburban municipalities are to be consolidated as above, we also have to
make assumptions about whether or not those people who voted for Norcross also voted
Fuentes, and vice versa. If we assume that all suburbanites in municipalities to be consoli-
dated who voted for Fuentes in 2009 also voted for Norcross, then in the next election
(after the consolidation) Kluchnick would only receive, at maximum, as many extra votes
as whichever winning candidate (Norcross or Fuentes) received the most votes in 2009 in
each respective municipality. In addition, some other candidate would receive the second
votes of everyone who had voted for both Norcross and Fuentes in 2009. If we assume
that each person who voted for Norcross voted for a second candidate other than Fuentes
in 2009 (and vice versa), then we can assume that Kluchnick would receive as many extra
votes as the sum of those votes cast for both Norcross and Fuentes. However, if, among
those suburbanites in municipalities to be consolidated who voted for either Norcross or
Fuentes in 2009, their second vote was cast for Kiuchnick, Kluchnick could not get an
extra vote from them in the following election. Suffice it to say that, since these analyses
are only meant for illustrative purposes, less assumptions need to be made by analyzing
state senate races.
92. N.J. DEPT. OF STATE, DIVISION OF ELECTIONS, OFFIciAL GENERAL ELEC-
TION RESULTS BY LEGISLATIVE DisTRcTs: SixTH LEGIsLATIVE DisTRicT (2007), availa-
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seat by a vote of 20,288 to 21,408. 93 Yet, Allen is a Republican who
would likely vote against the consolidation and border change. The
municipalities in her district might not be included in the consolidation
plan, or they might be included in a bid to make hers a Democratic
senate seat.
Below the state legislative level, local officials in the municipalities
to be consolidated, most notably mayors, council members, borough
commissioners, and school board members, though they would have no
authority once the state legislature decided to authorize a consolidation,
likely have some weak veto capabilities as a result of their political influ-
ence. The municipal officials might be offered commensurate positions
in a new city council, which in many cases would likely come with a
sizable salary increase. The borough commissioners of Merchantville, for
instance, each currently receive annual salaries of $982. Under the previ-
ously mentioned plan consolidating Philadelphia and Camden with
Gloucester City, Mount Ephraim, Audobon, Woodlynne, and Haddon
Heights, a new municipal council that included all the mayors and coun-
cil members of the previous municipalities (with the exception of Phila-
delphia's mayor, who would likely become the mayor of the newly
expanded city) would include fifty-two members. Under the plan to con-
solidate Philadelphia and Camden with Collingswood, Oaklyn, Haddon,
Merchantville, Woodlynne, and Pennsauken, the council would number
forty-nine.94 By comparison, the city councils of Chicago and New York
have fifty and fifty-one members, respectively.
ble at http://www.state.nj.us/state/elections/2007results/07general-election/Results-by-
leg-district/2007-6th-leg-district-by-municipality.pdf.
93. See N.J. DEPT. OF STATE, DIVISION OF ELECTIONS, OFFICIAL GENERAL ELEC-
TION RESULTS BY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS: SEVENTH LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT (2007),
available at http://www.state.nj.us/statelelections/2007results/O7general-election/Results-
by-leg-district/2007-7th-leg-district-by-municipality.pdf.
94. For information on municipal governments, see Philadelphia City Council,
http://www.phila.gov/citycouncil/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2010); Camden City Services and
Government, http://www.ci.camden.nj.us/ cityservices.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2010);
The Mayor & Council of Gloucester City, http://www.cityofgloucester.org/mayorcoun-
cil.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2010); Borough of Mount Ephraim, NJ, http:// www.
mountephraim-nj.com (last visited Apr. 20, 2010); Borough of Audobon, http://www.
boroughofaudubon.com/Board of commissioners.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2010);
Woodlynne Borough Directory, http:// www.woodlynnenj.com/directory.html (last vis-
ited Apr. 20, 2010); Haddon Heights Mayor and Council, http://www.haddonhts.com/
mayor-and-council.php (last visited Apr. 20, 2010); Coflingswood, Administration-
Mayor and. Commissioners, http://www.collingswood.com/government/mayor-and-com-
missioners (last visited Apr. 20, 2010); Oaklyn Home Page, http://www.oakland-nj.org
(follow "Borough Hall," "Mayor and Council," and "Borough Council" hyperlinks) (last
visited Apr. 20, 2010); Haddon Township, Welcome to the Township of Haddon, http://
www.haddonrwp.com/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2010); Merchantville.com, Mayor & Coun-
cil, http://www.merchantville.com/index.php/borough-mainmenu-29 (last visited Apr.
20, 2010); Pennsauken Township, NJ, Township Committee 2009, http://www.twp.
pennsauken.nj.us/penns-gov-township-committeecfm (last visited Apr. 20, 2010).
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The new city charter that authorized the expanded Philadelphia
council would hopefully also be used to achieve some recent and long-
standing reform goals, such as the elimination of row offices in Philadel-
phia (i.e., Sheriff, Register of Wills, Clerk of Quarter Sessions, and the
City Commissioners) and the establishment of term limits for council
members. 95 In addition, the new charter should likely provide for some
portion of the council seats to be at-large, in part to provide seats for
which the council members from suburban municipalities can be nomi-
nated. This might give them the hope of appealing to a broader electo-
rate, since the voters from their home municipalities would likely vote
them out of office after the consolidation.
Row offices in Philadelphia are, at least in the case of the Sheriff,
artifacts of the county government system that existed prior to the city-
county consolidation of 1854.96 No cities in New Jersey have ever been
consolidated with their counties, and the state thus still has twenty-one
county governments, including the Camden County Board of Freehold-
ers. For the purposes of the proposed consolidation, the path of least
resistance would most likely be to maintain Philadelphia's status as a con-
solidated city-county, with no independent county government, and to
separate from Camden County the municipalities that were consolidated
with Philadelphia. The current Camden County freeholders would likely
suffer very little electorally, because the suburban residents affected by
the consolidation would no longer be a part of their county. Indeed, the
remaining suburbanites in Camden County might be happier with the
freeholders, since their county taxes would no longer be subsidizing
Camden City.
As for the Camden County school boards and their members, the
least disruptive path, and one that might also reduce residential resistance
to consolidation, would be to consolidate all of the schools in the newly
expanded city into a single school district, but to convert all of the tradi-
tional public schools in the Camden County suburbs into charter
schools. The members of the prior New Jersey school boards could then
be made charter school board members, and current lower school stu-
dents would be guaranteed admission into the upper-level schools they
would have attended were they still in an independent district. Suburban
municipalities and suburban school board members would thus maintain
some control over their schools, though the schools would be open for
admission to the entire city population.
95. On the elimination of row offices, see generally PENNSYLVANIA INTERGOV-
ERNMENTAL COOPERATION AUTHORITY, A HISTORY WE CAN No LONGER AFFORD:
CONSOLIDATING PHILADELPHIA'S Row OFFICES (Nov. 2, 2009), available at http://
www.picapa.org/Docs/RowOfficesIssuePaper.pdf.
96. 3 J. THOMAS ScHARF & THOMPSON WEsrcorr, HISTORY OF PHILADELPHIA
1609-1884, at 1737-38 (1884).
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At the national level, as previously noted, the state border change
would require the approval of at least the two senators from New Jersey
and Pennsylvania, the nineteen members of the House of Representatives
from Pennsylvania (seven Republicans and twelve Democrats in the
111 th Congress), and the thirteen representatives from New Jersey (five
Republicans, eight Democrats).9 7 Assuming that the two Democratic
Pennsylvania representatives who would become New Jersey representa-
tives if the border change were approved, 98 would join the seven current
Republican Pennsylvania representatives to vote in favor of the border
change, nine of Pennsylvania's nineteen representatives would vote in
favor of the measure. They would be joined by the eight Democratic
New Jersey representatives. The result would be that a slim majority-
seventeen out of thirty-two members-of the House of Representatives
from New Jersey and Pennsylvania could be expected to approve the bor-
der change. Assuming deference by other House members to the majority
wishes of the two state delegations, the border change should thus pass in
the House.
The two Democratic U.S. Senators from Pennsylvania, Arlen Spec-
ter and Robert Casey, Jr., could be expected to block the boundary
change.9 9 Yet by the time the proposal had reached the Senate, Philadel-
phia would have established its move to New Jersey as a sufficiently credi-
ble threat that city officials would already be in negotiations with
Pennsylvania Democratic state legislators to keep Philadelphia in Penn-
sylvania. In exchange, the state would authorize the unilateral annexation
of one of the surrounding suburban counties on the Pennsylvania side.
Strategically, the best county to annex would be the politically weakest
county with the most Republicans. As part of Philadelphia, the local
offices in the county to be annexed, which are likely to some extent
Republican patronage resources, would be eliminated. And even in the
most populous of the outlying counties, Montgomery, the total popula-
tion of 778,048 is slightly smaller (by 6%) than the number of registered
Democrats in Philadelphia.1 ° °
97. For the New Jersey and Pennsylvania delegations to the U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives, see U.S. House of Representatives, Representative Offices, http://www.house.
gov/house/MemberWW-byState.shtml#pa (last visited Apr. 20, 2010).
98. For information about U.S. Reps. Chaka Fattah and Robert Brady, see id.
Fattah and Brady are two Pennsylvania representatives whose districts would be trans-
ferred almost entirely to New Jersey were Philadelphia to become part of the state.
99. As in all cases described in this article, the use of current elected officials is for
illustrative purposes. This is of course especially true of Senator Specter, who lost his
Democratic primary bid to Joe Sestak, and who is thus serving his final term in the US
Senate.
100. For population data on Montgomery County, see U.S. BuREAu OF THE
CENSUS, STATE & COUNTY QUICKFACTS, MONTGOMERY (coUNTY), PENNSYLVANIA,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/42/42091.htm (last visited Apr. 31, 2010). For
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By annexing a Republican suburban county, Philadelphia would
thus weaken a Republican state stronghold, which should appeal to
Democrats in Harrisburg. Yet, it would be precisely the Republicans in
the legislature pushing for the state border change to move Philadelphia
to New Jersey who would be providing Philadelphia the leverage to com-
pel Democrats in the state legislature to authorize the annexation of a
Republican suburb. Thus, the advantage that the Democrats gain by pro-
viding Philadelphia with a credible threat that it was going to move to
New Jersey might hopefully even compel Pennsylvania's two Democratic
U.S. senators to signal that they would approve of the border change.
Of the counties surrounding Philadelphia, Bucks County has the
highest percentage of Republicans representing it in the state legislature,
and it is the only surrounding county whose legislators hold no leader-
ship positions.1 ° ' By at least these indicators it is thus the politically
weakest and most Republican of the outlying counties. It also has the
highest median value for owner-occupied homes ($163,200) and the sec-
ond-highest median household income ($70,688). By annexing Bucks
County, Philadelphia's population would increase to approximately
2,069,038, and its median household income would increase from
approximately $35,431 to $44,966. 102
URBAN FEDERALISM
The strategy outlined above would work best under the following
conditions:
* A state border with a large and politically powerful city domi-
nated by a single party on one side, and a smaller, economically
distressed city, that requires significant state subsidies on the
other side.
" For the state that includes the bigger city, a state legislature
roughly equally divided between the two major parties, preferably
with a slight majority of the opposite party to that which controls
data on registered voters in Philadelphia, see PA DEP'T OF STATE, STATISTICS, supra note
76.
101. See Pennsylvania General Assembly, Bucks County PA Legislators, http://
www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/legis/home/findyourlegislator/county-ist.cfmiCNTYLIST=
bucks (last visited Apr. 20, 2010).
102. For income, home value, and population data on Bucks county, see U.S.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATE & COUNTY QUICKFACTS, BUCKS (COUNTY), PENN-
sYLvANIA, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/42/42017.html (last visited Apr. 31,
2010). For the same information on Philadelphia county, see U.S. BUREAU OF THE CEN-
SUS, STATE & COUNTY QuIcKFACrS, PHILADELPHIA (COUNTY), PENNSYLVANIA, http://
quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/42/42 101 .html. Figures are approximate because they are
calculated using number of households per county in 2000 and median household
income in 2007.
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the city, and a United States Congressional delegation with a
majority from the party that does not dominate the city.
" For the state with the smaller city, a state legislature and United
States congressional delegation dominated by the same party as
that which dominates the big city in the other state.
" Numerous small, preferably wealthy, suburban municipalities sur-
rounding both the smaller and larger cities.
As simply a thought experiment, the fact that this strategy proposes
to alter state borders for the sake of enlarging cities challenges the sanc-
tity of those state borders, and thus the sanctity of statehood. And by
challenging the sanctity of statehood, the strategy also challenges the
principle of representation by state in the United States Senate. Indeed,
the strategy can be seen as a logical continuation of the reapportionment
revolution that the U.S. Supreme Court initiated in Baker v. Carr-
which, like the current proposal, was a move toward redrawing political
boundaries in recognition of the rights of urban areas.
113
As a practical plan for city expansion, the significance of the pro-
posed strategy depends crucially on whether or not it results in state bor-
der changes, which, in the case of Philadelphia, depends on whether New
Jersey or Pennsylvania offer the city the best deal. If the strategy did not
result in state border changes, it would still create larger and thus more
politically powerful cities within states, yet those cities would likely no
longer be dominated by single parties as much as they had been in the
past. With more genuine two-party competition, the geographic expan-
sion of cities that remain in their home states would likely result in sig-
nificant reform movements within cities.
If the strategy did result in state border changes, it would concen-
trate large urban populations in fewer states, though those states would
have significantly larger populations. It would also result in less politically
competitive states, dominated to a greater extent by one of the two major
political parties. At the national level, it would concentrate urban delega-
tions in fewer states in the U.S. House of Representatives, decrease the
representation of urban populations in the Senate, and it would likely
also create more uniformly Republican and Democratic Congressional
delegations in both chambers, since those delegations would be more
aligned along the typical divide between urban Democrats and
nonurban, suburban, or exurban Republicans.
Concentrated into fewer state delegations and representing more
politically unified states, House representatives from urban areas would
be better positioned to coordinate among themselves, and they would
thus likely have more bargaining power in their chamber. Yet, they would
also confront a Senate where urban interests had less representation. The
state border changes themselves would have challenged the notion of rep-
103. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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resentation by state, and the urban delegations in the House, finding
themselves in permanent conflict with the Senate, might thus be
expected to raise a call for a Constitutional amendment to change the
basis of representation in the Senate from statehood to population. Yet,
the lack of urban representation in the Senate would have minimized the
likelihood of gaining the necessary two-thirds vote in that chamber, or
approval by two-thirds of the state legislatures.
The alternative to a constitutional amendment would be a new con-
stitutional convention. The last convention, although it was held in a
city, was drafted for a nation that was notoriously ambivalent, if not
hostile, to big cities, and in which only approximately 5% of the popula-
tion lived in communities of 2,500 or more people. 10 4 The anti-urban
sentiment of many of the convention attendees made it at least somewhat
easier to negotiate representation by statehood for the U.S. Senate. At the
1787 convention, Elbridge Gerry could thus also claim that he "con-
ceived it to be the [general] sense of America, that neither the Seat of a
State Govt. nor any large commercial City should be the seat of the [gen-
eral government]." 1 ° 5 In a nation today of more than 300 million people,
where nearly 84% of the population lives in metropolitan areas, 10 6 the
conversation might go a bit differently. It seems at least worthwhile to
have that conversation.
104. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HIsTOIuCAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED
STATES: 1789-1945, at 25 (1949).
105. As recorded in JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CON-
VENTION OF 1787, July 26, 1787, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th-century/
debates_726.asp. Gerry is quoted, among other places, in Richardson .Dilworth, Bringing
the City Back In, in THE CITY IN AMERICAN POLITIcAL DEVELOPMENT 3 (Richardson
Dilworth ed., 2009). See also Robert C. Lieberman, The City and Exceptionalism is
American Political Development, in id., for a discussion of traditional American anti-
urbanism.
106. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION BY CoRE BASED STATISTICAL AREA
STATUS AND STATE: 2008, available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2010/
tables/i 0s0024.pdf.
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